JESINOSKI ET UX. v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS,
INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–684. Argued November 4, 2014—Decided January 13, 2015
Exactly three years after borrowing money from respondent Country-
wide Home Loans, Inc., to refinance their home mortgage, petitioners
Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski sent Countrywide and respondent Bank
of America Home Loans, which had acquired Countrywide, a letter
purporting to rescind the transaction. Bank of America replied, re-
fusing to acknowledge the rescission’s validity. One year and one day
later, the Jesinoskis filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaration
of rescission and damages. The District Court entered judgment on
the pleadings for respondents, concluding that a borrower can exer-
cise the Truth in Lending Act’s right to rescind a loan, see 15 U. S. C.
§1635(a), (f), only by filing a lawsuit within three years of the date
the loan was consummated. The Jesinoskis’ complaint, filed four
years and one day after the loan’s consummation, was ineffective.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only
provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file
suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s unequivocal terms—a bor-
rower “shall have the right to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor . . .
of his intention to do so” (emphasis added)—leave no doubt that re-
scission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his in-
tention to rescind. This conclusion is not altered by §1635(f), which
states when the right to rescind must be exercised, but says nothing
about how that right is exercised. Nor does §1635(g)—which states
that “in addition to rescission the court may award relief . . . not re-
lating to the right to rescind”—support respondents’ view that rescis-
sion is necessarily a consequence of judicial action. And the fact that
the Act modified the common-law condition precedent to rescission atlaw, see §1635(b), hardly implies that the Act thereby codified rescission in equity. Pp. 2–5.
729 F. 3d 1092, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–684. Argued November 4, 2014—Decided January 13, 2015
Exactly three years after borrowing money from respondent Country-
wide Home Loans, Inc., to refinance their home mortgage, petitioners
Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski sent Countrywide and respondent Bank
of America Home Loans, which had acquired Countrywide, a letter
purporting to rescind the transaction. Bank of America replied, re-
fusing to acknowledge the rescission’s validity. One year and one day
later, the Jesinoskis filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaration
of rescission and damages. The District Court entered judgment on
the pleadings for respondents, concluding that a borrower can exer-
cise the Truth in Lending Act’s right to rescind a loan, see 15 U. S. C.
§1635(a), (f), only by filing a lawsuit within three years of the date
the loan was consummated. The Jesinoskis’ complaint, filed four
years and one day after the loan’s consummation, was ineffective.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only
provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file
suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s unequivocal terms—a bor-
rower “shall have the right to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor . . .
of his intention to do so” (emphasis added)—leave no doubt that re-
scission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his in-
tention to rescind. This conclusion is not altered by §1635(f), which
states when the right to rescind must be exercised, but says nothing
about how that right is exercised. Nor does §1635(g)—which states
that “in addition to rescission the court may award relief . . . not re-
lating to the right to rescind”—support respondents’ view that rescis-
sion is necessarily a consequence of judicial action. And the fact that
the Act modified the common-law condition precedent to rescission atlaw, see §1635(b), hardly implies that the Act thereby codified rescission in equity. Pp. 2–5.
729 F. 3d 1092, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
