Thursday, December 16, 2010
Sunday, December 12, 2010
Anat Admati, in his post on 12/4/2010 on Baseline Scenario, makes a point that by its monetary policies of the past decade our government has been subsidizing risk. See the full post here:http://baselinescenario.com/2010/12/04/what-jamie-dimon-won%E2%80%99t-tell-you-his-big-bank-would-be-dangerously-leveraged/
I would go even further and say that, by its policies (as addressed in my previous post "Who Cased The Financial Crisis), our government is sponsoring FRAUD (i.e. risk raised to 100%). Indeed, once you are a bank and are subsidized to use leverage and take risk, why not make the risk 100% by creating a junk loan bound to fail and immediately dump it on the federal government? You make money on your fees, and the tax payer picks up the tab when the loan fails. Ain't that a brilliant system...
I would go even further and say that, by its policies (as addressed in my previous post "Who Cased The Financial Crisis), our government is sponsoring FRAUD (i.e. risk raised to 100%). Indeed, once you are a bank and are subsidized to use leverage and take risk, why not make the risk 100% by creating a junk loan bound to fail and immediately dump it on the federal government? You make money on your fees, and the tax payer picks up the tab when the loan fails. Ain't that a brilliant system...
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Useful Overview of MERS Problems by Daily Finance
Daily Finance has published an excellent article on MERS with many helpful links to congressional testimony, court pleadings, and other detailed sources of information on the issues.
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/real-estate/mers-mortgage-database-clouds-millions-of-titles/19746420/?a_dgi=aolshare_twitter&icid=sphere_copyright
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/real-estate/mers-mortgage-database-clouds-millions-of-titles/19746420/?a_dgi=aolshare_twitter&icid=sphere_copyright
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
Burden of proof in nonjudicial states, Part II: Possible solution for nonjudicial states
In Virginia and other nonjudicial states, most documents filed in land records (such as a deed) are somewhat self-authenticating in that they constitute prima facie evidence of the truth of the matters stated therein. Pretender lenders use it to their advantage all the time.
Specifically, in Virginia, for instance, foreclosures are commenced by filing a Deed of Appointment (of substitute trustees) – a document in which a secured creditor appoints a substitute trustee in place of the original trustee to conduct a foreclosure. The reason such substitution is possible in the first place is because Virginia is a "title theory" state: when obtaining a loan, a homeowner/borrower takes title to the property and immediately gives it to a neutral party – the trustee, to be held in trust for both the bank and the borrower (who in the meantime holds "equitable" title – legal fiction), to ensure that either: (1) the homeowner gets full title upon satisfaction of the mortgage or (2) the bank gets title in case of default (through foreclosure). The trustee is thus supposedly a neutral party resolving any disputes between the lender and the borrower out-of-court. I say "supposedly" neutral because we all know where foreclosure trustees' business comes from.
So, pretender-lenders will often file a Deed of Appointment reciting that "First Fraud Bank is the owner and holder of the Note secured by certain deed of trust dated xx/xx/xxxx and does here by appoint Foreclosure Mill as Substitute Trustee." Then, when one examines the chain of title after the property is sold and conveyed to First Fraud by the foreclosure trustee, the bank's name does appear somewhere in the chain of title: namely, in the self-serving Deed of Appointment. In a few cases, such a Deed and its self-serving proclamations were refuted by the homeowner by showing that the Deed was executed by a robo-signer, etc. Other times, the bank could not simply start a foreclosure by substituting a trustee because the homeowner or someone else had recorded other documents with respect to the property, thus creating a cloud on the title. See my post below regarding the notorious "Administrative Process."
As a result of such cases, a new strategy has emerged. Let's say you are faced with a nonjudicial foreclosure by some entity you never heard of, such as a securitization trust XYZ, etc. If you file a complaint in state court asking the judge to enjoin (stop) the foreclosure because the entity is a stranger to your loan, you are likely to quickly lose because the entity will point to its own recorded Deed of Appointment as the prima facie evidence of their right to foreclose. Unless you've already done some discovery (via public sources or otherwise), you will likely have nothing to rebut their self-serving statements in the Deed of Appointment except your own statements of disagreement. You will want them to prove their self-serving statements, but the judge will likely tell you that your rebuttal statements are just statements, and you can't use them to force the other side to prove their case. I know it seems unfair, but the judge may also explain that, while your statements are just statements, their statements are "recordings" entitled to prima facie (i.e., until rebutted) validity.
So what you do is turn your statements into "recordings" as well. Before you file a complaint, you record those same statements that you would put in your complaint (as long as they are truthful) in a deed of appointment. Just like they review their paperwork, take the position that their Bank as Trustee should be able to collect on the note and is therefore the noteholder, and then recite their baseless conclusions in their recorded document, you can take your evidence, make appropriate conclusions (e.g., that some now-defunct entity still holds the note; that such-and-such deed is void because it's executed by a known robo-signer, etc.), and then record such statements in the land records after their DOA. Depending on the merits of your case, you may decide to even be so aggressive as to remove their previously-appointed substitute trustee. Caution: this often will not be doable without exposing oneself to charges of fraud. -- See my prior post on "administrative process."
What will then happen is that there will be conflicting records of equal evidentiary weight with respect to the property. Since it is the bank that is seeking to change the status quo (force a transfer of the property), they will likely bring a suit against you to enjoin (stop) you from recording documents. That's when you just sit back, poke holes in their case, and force them to plead and prove their case to the full extent required by the rules of evidence.
Specifically, in Virginia, for instance, foreclosures are commenced by filing a Deed of Appointment (of substitute trustees) – a document in which a secured creditor appoints a substitute trustee in place of the original trustee to conduct a foreclosure. The reason such substitution is possible in the first place is because Virginia is a "title theory" state: when obtaining a loan, a homeowner/borrower takes title to the property and immediately gives it to a neutral party – the trustee, to be held in trust for both the bank and the borrower (who in the meantime holds "equitable" title – legal fiction), to ensure that either: (1) the homeowner gets full title upon satisfaction of the mortgage or (2) the bank gets title in case of default (through foreclosure). The trustee is thus supposedly a neutral party resolving any disputes between the lender and the borrower out-of-court. I say "supposedly" neutral because we all know where foreclosure trustees' business comes from.
So, pretender-lenders will often file a Deed of Appointment reciting that "First Fraud Bank is the owner and holder of the Note secured by certain deed of trust dated xx/xx/xxxx and does here by appoint Foreclosure Mill as Substitute Trustee." Then, when one examines the chain of title after the property is sold and conveyed to First Fraud by the foreclosure trustee, the bank's name does appear somewhere in the chain of title: namely, in the self-serving Deed of Appointment. In a few cases, such a Deed and its self-serving proclamations were refuted by the homeowner by showing that the Deed was executed by a robo-signer, etc. Other times, the bank could not simply start a foreclosure by substituting a trustee because the homeowner or someone else had recorded other documents with respect to the property, thus creating a cloud on the title. See my post below regarding the notorious "Administrative Process."
As a result of such cases, a new strategy has emerged. Let's say you are faced with a nonjudicial foreclosure by some entity you never heard of, such as a securitization trust XYZ, etc. If you file a complaint in state court asking the judge to enjoin (stop) the foreclosure because the entity is a stranger to your loan, you are likely to quickly lose because the entity will point to its own recorded Deed of Appointment as the prima facie evidence of their right to foreclose. Unless you've already done some discovery (via public sources or otherwise), you will likely have nothing to rebut their self-serving statements in the Deed of Appointment except your own statements of disagreement. You will want them to prove their self-serving statements, but the judge will likely tell you that your rebuttal statements are just statements, and you can't use them to force the other side to prove their case. I know it seems unfair, but the judge may also explain that, while your statements are just statements, their statements are "recordings" entitled to prima facie (i.e., until rebutted) validity.
So what you do is turn your statements into "recordings" as well. Before you file a complaint, you record those same statements that you would put in your complaint (as long as they are truthful) in a deed of appointment. Just like they review their paperwork, take the position that their Bank as Trustee should be able to collect on the note and is therefore the noteholder, and then recite their baseless conclusions in their recorded document, you can take your evidence, make appropriate conclusions (e.g., that some now-defunct entity still holds the note; that such-and-such deed is void because it's executed by a known robo-signer, etc.), and then record such statements in the land records after their DOA. Depending on the merits of your case, you may decide to even be so aggressive as to remove their previously-appointed substitute trustee. Caution: this often will not be doable without exposing oneself to charges of fraud. -- See my prior post on "administrative process."
What will then happen is that there will be conflicting records of equal evidentiary weight with respect to the property. Since it is the bank that is seeking to change the status quo (force a transfer of the property), they will likely bring a suit against you to enjoin (stop) you from recording documents. That's when you just sit back, poke holes in their case, and force them to plead and prove their case to the full extent required by the rules of evidence.
Before addressing a loan modification, it is necessary to determine the bank's authority to approve such
While HAMP is not mandatory for the banks, nor does it provide any financial incentives for the banks to modify loans ($1,000.00 per loan – are you kidding me? Why was there not public outrage back when this laughable figure first appeared in the press? I certainly was indignant...), HAMP may still useful in fighting what Neil Garfield calls "the BIG LIE" – the banks' asserted claims to properties in foreclosure in spite of a glaring lack of documentation to support such bogus claims.
I see the main benefit of HAMP and its publicity as providing us the ability to change the narrative in most foreclosure defense cases. To change the story about whether anyone is trying to get a free house by asserting "technical" defenses to foreclosure, such as an alleged lender's lack of standing, broken chain of title, etc.
In seems that instead of coming to court and saying to the judge that the bank does "not have the right to foreclose," which is often frowned upon as a meager attempt to grasp at a technicality to stall the inevitable, we can come to court and say: "Judge, we have been trying to get a modification from these people; the government says we should be able to do so of the numbers are right, the government pushes the banks to do so, yet, we have received four (two, three, whatever) denials from these people even though our income and other numbers stack up. In pursuing the matter further, we have uncovered the existence of serious issues as to these people's authority and ability to approve a modification. It appears that the lack of such authority is the real reason for the inexplicable multiple denials of a mod in spite of our steady, qualifying income."
Thus, homeowners are not trying to get a free house, but rather press the bank for discovery for the common goal which now has the imprimatur of the government – a loan modification. Of course, regardless of any loan modification, the only party trying to get a free house is a bank that neither originated the loan nor purchased it.
I see the main benefit of HAMP and its publicity as providing us the ability to change the narrative in most foreclosure defense cases. To change the story about whether anyone is trying to get a free house by asserting "technical" defenses to foreclosure, such as an alleged lender's lack of standing, broken chain of title, etc.
In seems that instead of coming to court and saying to the judge that the bank does "not have the right to foreclose," which is often frowned upon as a meager attempt to grasp at a technicality to stall the inevitable, we can come to court and say: "Judge, we have been trying to get a modification from these people; the government says we should be able to do so of the numbers are right, the government pushes the banks to do so, yet, we have received four (two, three, whatever) denials from these people even though our income and other numbers stack up. In pursuing the matter further, we have uncovered the existence of serious issues as to these people's authority and ability to approve a modification. It appears that the lack of such authority is the real reason for the inexplicable multiple denials of a mod in spite of our steady, qualifying income."
Thus, homeowners are not trying to get a free house, but rather press the bank for discovery for the common goal which now has the imprimatur of the government – a loan modification. Of course, regardless of any loan modification, the only party trying to get a free house is a bank that neither originated the loan nor purchased it.
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Foreclosure Defense Strategies and Preparation
The purpose of this post is to provide a general overview and paint a broad picture of available foreclosure defense strategies. Generally, if you are facing a foreclosure, in most cases you should be able to draw upon defenses from the three broad categories described below.
Category 2 can be described as "technical" defenses. Such defenses seem to be the most attractive to most people, as they are the easiest to comprehend. Technical defenses amount to having the bank prove a "chain of title," i.e., that the bank has any interest in the loan, that the loan was securitized properly, that the bank either lent the money or purchased the loan, etc. In contrast to the previous category of defenses, this category mainly pertains to the conduct of the parties after the closing of the loan, and may also involve claims against the foreclosure trustee for not ensuring that the foreclosing party has established its authority to foreclose, as well as post-closing conduct of misapplying payments by the servicer.
While this category is the easiest to understand and, arguably, the easiest to present, it is also the least likely to provide any tangible "win," at least at the time of this writing. Nonetheless, the tide is turning, and this situation may soon change substantially. See my November post "Technical Defenses Are Growing For Securitized Loans."
Category 3 is based on the bank's conduct shortly before and after the default, i.e., conduct during loan modification negotiations and other loss mitigation efforts undertaken as a result of non-payment. This category involves mostly common law claims of fraud, interference with homeowner's right to cure a default, estoppel (equitable, promissory, and judicial), breach of contract and of implied covenant of good faith, etc. Occasionally, it may also involve post-closing conduct of misapplying payments by the servicer
Thus, to brace themselves up for foreclosure defense, interested homeowners should mentally break up their loan history into the above three periods of time: shortly prior to closing and the closing itself, after closing and prior to stopping payments (default), and shortly prior to and during default and loan modification process.
Homeowners should then gather documentation pertaining to each time period. For category 1, it would include all pre-closing and closing documents. For category 3, it would include all correspondence and other records during the loss mitigation process (that's why it is so important to document every step of your attempts at loan modification!). And for category 2 it would include the combination of the above, plus research of other documents such as those pertaining to securitization of the loan, any assignments of the mortgage/deed-of-trust, and any allonges to the note.
With this in mind, if you are or may be facing foreclosure and need to prepare a defense, get cranking on collecting the necessary records and information for each time period outlined above and have everything prepared and ready to go in some organized form. Good luck!
Category 1 is defenses arising out of violations of consumer protection laws. These include federal laws such as TILA, RESPA, HOPA, ECOA, FDCPA, etc., as well state consumer protection statutes, which often include mortgage broker liability. This category of defenses is based primarily on the conduct of the parties shortly before and at the closing of the loan. This category may also involve common law causes of action such as fraud and related defects in the note and trust deed rendering them void ab initio.
This category provides decent defenses in terms of substance, but is much more complex in terms of factual development and the number of claims that need to be hammered out and presented when compared to the other two categories below. Additionally, because it is based on the conduct before and at the closing, it is susceptible to statute-of-limitation defenses (one- and three-year limitations in most cases) and hence may not be available with respect to most older loans. Facts establishing equitable tolling and other "extensions" of claims must be carefully plead at the outset and with specificity.
While this category is the easiest to understand and, arguably, the easiest to present, it is also the least likely to provide any tangible "win," at least at the time of this writing. Nonetheless, the tide is turning, and this situation may soon change substantially. See my November post "Technical Defenses Are Growing For Securitized Loans."
Category 3 is based on the bank's conduct shortly before and after the default, i.e., conduct during loan modification negotiations and other loss mitigation efforts undertaken as a result of non-payment. This category involves mostly common law claims of fraud, interference with homeowner's right to cure a default, estoppel (equitable, promissory, and judicial), breach of contract and of implied covenant of good faith, etc. Occasionally, it may also involve post-closing conduct of misapplying payments by the servicer
Thus, to brace themselves up for foreclosure defense, interested homeowners should mentally break up their loan history into the above three periods of time: shortly prior to closing and the closing itself, after closing and prior to stopping payments (default), and shortly prior to and during default and loan modification process.
Homeowners should then gather documentation pertaining to each time period. For category 1, it would include all pre-closing and closing documents. For category 3, it would include all correspondence and other records during the loss mitigation process (that's why it is so important to document every step of your attempts at loan modification!). And for category 2 it would include the combination of the above, plus research of other documents such as those pertaining to securitization of the loan, any assignments of the mortgage/deed-of-trust, and any allonges to the note.
With this in mind, if you are or may be facing foreclosure and need to prepare a defense, get cranking on collecting the necessary records and information for each time period outlined above and have everything prepared and ready to go in some organized form. Good luck!
Should you use an "administrative process" to fight your mortgage lender?
There has been this idea circulating around the internet that you can cancel or rescind your mortgage by private correspondence with your lender through a so-called "administrative process." The idea is that you ask your lender to prove they have an interest in your loan, and then, when the lender fails to respond, you unilaterally rescind your mortgage, put your lender on notice, and record such actions with respect to the property at your local land records office.
Sounds good in theory, except that in detail, from what I can tell, this "process" is a bunch of pseudo-legal gobblygook. As far as I can see, there is no solid basis in the law for this "administrative process." You can throw in together a few legal terms and concepts, but there is not enough real basis that would have a chance to stand up in court.
Also, just because someone shows you recorded documents conveying the property to them free and clear, it doesn't mean that the property is free and clear. As soon as that person actually stops making payments (did you assume they are not making payments?) and as soon as the bank gets to foreclosing on the property, all it takes is a simple legal challenge to the nonsensical documents recorded by the homeowner, and an order declaring such documents void will be entered along with an injunction prohibiting such recordings in the future. I am actually describing several real cases that I have seen.
So the question is not whether you can invent some private process and record documents purporting to free your property. The question is whether any such actions will have any legal validity so as to deprive the bank from collecting on the mortgage and taking the property by foreclosure. What's worse, I heard one judge say that this administrative process and its recording of bogus documents amount to outright intentional fraud on the part of the homeowner in trying to steal the house without paying off the mortgage. Moreover, the individuals that promote and advise people as to such a process are engaging, in my opinion, in blatant unauthorized practice of law, and it is only a matter of time before they are caught.
However, if you have already gone through this "administrative process," there is one decent benefit to it, especially if you are in a nonjudicial state. Unless the bank takes an aggressive stance and just completely ignores your recordings and forecloses on your house (which is hard to do because prospective buyers are not as aggressive), they would have to first remove the homeowner-created cloud on the title. This forces the bank to file a lawsuit. The bank becomes a plaintiff in the action, and this re-orients the parties and shifts the burden of proof to the bank. It forces the bank to prove that they have a claim to the property, while all the homeowner has to do is sit back and poke holes in their pleadings. It is easier to use "lack of standing" and other technical defenses on a motion to dismiss rather than in a complaint to stop a nonjudicial foreclosure.
The reason I say that the shifting of burden of proof is a "decent" and not a "great" benefit is because, while you gain some strength from reorienting the parties, you lose lots of credibility before the judge as someone who is trying to get a "free house" not by merely challenging a foreclosure, but by also using bogus recordings, not to mention possible fraud charges. Therefore, you should be very careful with this whole situation and be prepared to explain to the judge the basis of your earlier recordings.
Hopefully, the above account will give people a more clear picture of what they are up against when considering or engaging in going through an "administrative process" with respect to their property.
Sounds good in theory, except that in detail, from what I can tell, this "process" is a bunch of pseudo-legal gobblygook. As far as I can see, there is no solid basis in the law for this "administrative process." You can throw in together a few legal terms and concepts, but there is not enough real basis that would have a chance to stand up in court.
Also, just because someone shows you recorded documents conveying the property to them free and clear, it doesn't mean that the property is free and clear. As soon as that person actually stops making payments (did you assume they are not making payments?) and as soon as the bank gets to foreclosing on the property, all it takes is a simple legal challenge to the nonsensical documents recorded by the homeowner, and an order declaring such documents void will be entered along with an injunction prohibiting such recordings in the future. I am actually describing several real cases that I have seen.
So the question is not whether you can invent some private process and record documents purporting to free your property. The question is whether any such actions will have any legal validity so as to deprive the bank from collecting on the mortgage and taking the property by foreclosure. What's worse, I heard one judge say that this administrative process and its recording of bogus documents amount to outright intentional fraud on the part of the homeowner in trying to steal the house without paying off the mortgage. Moreover, the individuals that promote and advise people as to such a process are engaging, in my opinion, in blatant unauthorized practice of law, and it is only a matter of time before they are caught.
However, if you have already gone through this "administrative process," there is one decent benefit to it, especially if you are in a nonjudicial state. Unless the bank takes an aggressive stance and just completely ignores your recordings and forecloses on your house (which is hard to do because prospective buyers are not as aggressive), they would have to first remove the homeowner-created cloud on the title. This forces the bank to file a lawsuit. The bank becomes a plaintiff in the action, and this re-orients the parties and shifts the burden of proof to the bank. It forces the bank to prove that they have a claim to the property, while all the homeowner has to do is sit back and poke holes in their pleadings. It is easier to use "lack of standing" and other technical defenses on a motion to dismiss rather than in a complaint to stop a nonjudicial foreclosure.
The reason I say that the shifting of burden of proof is a "decent" and not a "great" benefit is because, while you gain some strength from reorienting the parties, you lose lots of credibility before the judge as someone who is trying to get a "free house" not by merely challenging a foreclosure, but by also using bogus recordings, not to mention possible fraud charges. Therefore, you should be very careful with this whole situation and be prepared to explain to the judge the basis of your earlier recordings.
Hopefully, the above account will give people a more clear picture of what they are up against when considering or engaging in going through an "administrative process" with respect to their property.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Judge Schack continues to hold banks to their burden of proof: Wash. Mut. Bank v. Phillip, 2010 NY Slip Op 52034
2010 NY Slip Op 52034
Washington Mutual Bank, Plaintiff,
v.
Sheila U. Phillip, et. al., Defendants.
v.
Sheila U. Phillip, et. al., Defendants.
16359/08
Supreme Court
Of State Of New York
Kings County
Of State Of New York
Kings County
Decided on November 29, 2010
Plaintiff: Matthews & Matthews, P.C. Huntington NY
Defendant: No Appearances.
Arthur M. Schack, J.
In this foreclosure action, plaintiff, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK (WAMU), moved for an order of reference and related relief for the premises located at 2035 East 63rd Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8406, Lot 64, County of Kings). On October 20, 2010, Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau issued an Administrative Order requiring that plaintiff's counsel in foreclosure actions "effective immediately... shall file with the court in each such action an affirmation, in the form attached hereto... in cases pending... at the time of filing... the proposed order of reference." Therefore, I instructed plaintiff's WAMU's counsel, in my decision and order of November 9, 2010, that:
For this Court to consider the instant motion for an order of reference, plaintiff's counsel must comply with the new Rule, promulgated by
Page 2
Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau on October 20, 2010 and announced that day by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, or the instant foreclosure action will be dismissed with prejudice. The new Rule mandates an affirmation by plaintiff's counsel, which must be submitted to my Chambers (not the Foreclosure Department), 360 Adams Street, Room 478, Brooklyn, NY 11201, requiring plaintiff's counsel to state that he or she communicated on a specific date with a named representative of plaintiff WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, who informed counsel that he or she:
(a) has personally reviewed plaintiff's documents and records relating to this case; (b) has reviewed the Summons and Complaint, and all other papers filed in this matter is support of foreclosure; and, (c) has confirmed both the factual accuracy of these court filings and the accuracy of the notarizations contained therein.
Further, plaintiff's counsel, based upon his or her communication with plaintiff's representative named above, must upon his or her "inspection of the papers filed with the Court and other diligent inquiry,... certify that, to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief, the Summons and Complaint filed in support of this action for foreclosure are complete and accurate in all relevan respect."
Counsel is reminded that the new standard Court affirmation form states in a note at the top of the first page:
During and after August 2010, numerous and widespread insufficiencies in foreclosure filings in various courts around the nation were reported by major mortgage lenders and other authorities. These insufficiencies include: failure of plaintiffs and their counsel to review documents and files to establish standing and other foreclosure requisites; filing of notarized affidavits which falsely attest to such review and to other critical facts in the foreclosure process; and "robosigning" of documents by parties and counsel. The wrongful filing and prosecution of foreclosure proceedings which are discovered to suffer from these defects may be cause for disciplinary and other sanctions upon participating counsel.[Emphasis added]
According to the October 20, 2010 Office of Court Administration press release about the new filing requirement:
The New York State court system has instituted a new filing requirement in residential foreclosure cases to
Page 3
protect the integrity of the foreclosure process and prevent wrongful foreclosures. Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman today announced that plaintiff's counsel in foreclosure actions will be required to file an affirmation certifying that counsel has taken reasonable steps — including inquiry to banks and lenders and careful review of the papers filed in the case — to verify the accuracy of documents filed in support of residential foreclosures. The new filing requirement was introduced by the Chief Judge in response to recent disclosures by major mortgage lenders of significant insufficiencies — including widespread deficiencies in notarization and "robosigning" of supporting documents — in residential foreclosure filings in courts nationwide. The new requirement is effective immediately and was created with the approval of the Presiding Justices of all four Judicial Departments.
Chief Judge Lippman said, "We cannot allow the courts in New York State to stand by idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves basic human needs — such as a family home — during this period of economic crisis. This new filing requirement will play a vital role in ensuring that the documents judges rely on will be thoroughly examined, accurate, and error-free before any judge is asked to take the drastic step of foreclosure." [Emphasis added] (See Gretchen Morgenson and Andrew Martin, Big Legal Clash on Foreclosure is Taking Shape, New York Times, Oct. 21, 2010; Andrew Keshner, New Court Rules Says Attorneys Must Verify Foreclosure Papers, NYLJ, Oct. 21, 2010).
Plaintiff WAMU's counsel, Donna D. Maio, Esq. of Matthews & Matthews, in response to my November 9, 2010 decision and order, submitted an affirmation, dated November 11, 2010, in which she stated "[o]n the date of June 4, 2008, I communicated with Mark Phelps, Esq., House Counsel and representative of Plaintiff, who informed me the he (a) has personally reviewed Plaintiff's documents and records relating to this case; (b) has reviewed the Summons and Complaint, and all other papers filed in this matter is support of foreclosure; and (c) has
Page 4
confirmed both the factual accuracy of these court filings and the accuracy of the notarizations contained therein [Emphasis added]." Further, Ms. Maio affirmed that "[b]ased upon my communication with Mark Phelps, Esq., as well as my own inspection of the papers filed with the Court and other diligent inquiry, I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the Summons and Complaint and all other documents filed in support of this action for foreclosure are complete and accurate in all relevant respects [Emphasis added]."
After I received Ms. Maio's November 11, 2010 affirmation I checked the instant motion for an order of reference and discovered that the motion failed to: have an affidavit of merit executed by an officer of plaintiff WAMU of someone with a valid power of attorney from plaintiff WAMU; and, despite Ms. Maio's affirming the accuracy of plaintiff WAMU's papers in the instant action, the >complaint and other documents filed in support of the instant for foreclosure are incomplete and inaccurate.
The Court grants leave to plaintiff, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order, to: correct the deficiencies in its papers, which are explained below; and, using the new standard Court form, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2106, and under the penalties of perjury, file a new affirmation that plaintiff WAMU's counsel has "based upon... communications [with named representative or representatives of plaintiff], as well as upon my own inspection and reasonable inquiry under the circumstances,... that, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the Summons, Complaint and other papers filed or submitted to the Court in this matter contain no false statements of fact or law"; and, is "aware of my obligations under New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 1200) and 22 NYCRR Part 130."
Again, failure to correct the deficiencies listed following and file a new affirmation, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order, will result in the instant foreclosure action being dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant GJAVIT THAQI borrowed $600,000.00 from WAMU on November 6, 2006. The note and mortgage were recorded in the Office of the City Register of the New York City Department of Finance, on November 13, 2006, at City Register File Number (CRFN) 2006000629092. Plaintiff WAMU commenced the instant foreclosure action on June 6, 2008. Defendants defaulted in the instant action.
Plaintiff WAMU filed the motion for an order of reference and related relief on November 25, 2008. However, plaintiff WAMU's moving papers for an order of reference failed to present an "affidavit made by the party," pursuant to CPLR § 3215 (f), whether by an officer of WAMU or someone with a power of attorney from WAMU.
Further, the verification of the complaint was not executed by an officer of WAMU, but by Benita Taylor, a "Research Support Analyst of Washington Mutual Bank, the plaintiff in the within action" a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, on June 4, 2008. This is the same day that Ms. Maio claims to have communicated with "Mark Phelps, Esq., House Counsel." I checked the Office of Court Administration's Attorney Registry and found that Mark Phelps is not now nor has been an attorney registered in the State of New York. Moreover, the Court does not know what "House" employs Mr. Phelps.
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Both Mr. Phelps and Ms. Maio should have discovered the defects in Ms. Taylor's verification of the subject complaint. The jurat states that the verification was executed in the State of New York and the County of Suffolk [the home county of plaintiff's counsel], but the notary public who took the signature is Deborah Yamaguichi, a Florida notary public, not a New York notary public. Thus, the verification lacks merit and is a nullity. Further, Ms. Yamaguchi's notarization states that Ms. Taylor's verification was "Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of June 2008." Even if the jurat properly stated that it was executed in the State of Florida and the County of Duval, where Jacksonville is located, the oath failed to have a certificate required by CPLR § 2309 (c) for "oaths and affirmations taken without the state." CPLR § 2309 (c) requires that:
An oath or affirmation taken without the state shall be treated as if taken within the state if it is accompanied by such certificate or certificates as would be required to entitle a deed acknowledged without the state to be recorded within the state if such deed had been acknowledged before the officer who administered the oath or affirmation.The Court is distressed that Ms. Maio falsely affirmed on November 11, 2010 that "pursuant to CPLR § 2106 and under the penalties of perjury," that "the Summons and Complaint and all other documents filed in support of this action for foreclosure are complete and accurate in all relevant respects," when the instant motion papers are incomplete and the verification is defective. Moreover, the purpose of the October 20, 2010 Administrative Order requiring affirmations by plaintiff's counsel in foreclosure cases is, according to Chief Judge Lippman, in his October 20, 2010 press release, to ensure "that the documents judges rely on will be thoroughly examined, accurate, and error-free before any judge is asked to take the drastic step of foreclosure."
Ms. Maio should have consulted with a representative or representatives of plaintiff WAMU or is successors subsequent to receiving my November 9, 2010 order, not referring back to an alleged June 4, 2008 communication with "House Counsel." Affirmations by plaintiff's counsel in foreclosure actions, pursuant to Chief Administrative Judge Ann t. Pfau's October 20, 2010 Administrative Order, mandates in foreclosure actions prospective communication by plaintiff's counsel with plaintiff's representative or representatives to prevent the widespread insufficiencies now found in foreclosure filings, such as: failure to review files to establish standing; filing of notarized affidavits that falsely attest to such review, and, "robosigning: of documents.
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of the defendant or defendant's admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee "to compute the amount due to the plaintiff." In the instant action, plaintiff's application for an order of reference is a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale. (Home Sav. Of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]).
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Plaintiff failed to meet the clear requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f) for a default judgment.
On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter, and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party... Where a verified complaint has been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the default shall be made by the party or the party's attorney. [Emphasisadded].
Plaintiff failed to submit "proof of the facts" in "an affidavit made by the party." The Court needs an affidavit of merit executed by an officer of plaintiff WAMU or its successor in interest, or by someone granted this authority with a valid power of attorney from WAMU or its successor in interest for that express purpose. Additionally, if a power of attorney is presented to this Court and it refers to a Pooling and Servicing agreement, the Court needs a properly offered copy of the Pooling and Servicing agreement, to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiff. (EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batista, 15 Misc 3d 1143 (A) [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Lewis, 14 Misc 3d 1201 (A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]).
If a Pooling and Servicing Agreement is presented with a renewed motion for an order of reference, it must be an original or a copy of the original certified by plaintiffs' attorney, pursuant to CPLR § 2105. CPLR § 2105 states that "an attorney admitted to practice in the court of the state may certify that it has been compared by him with the original and found to be a true and complete copy." (See Security Pacific Nat. Trust Co. v Cuevas, 176 Misc 2d 846 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1998]).
In Blam v Netcher, 17 AD3d 495, 496 [2d Dept 2005], the Court reversed a default judgment granted in Supreme Court, Nassau County, holding that:
In support of her motion for leave to enter judgment against the defendant upon her default in answering, the plaintiff failed to proffer either an affidavit of the facts or a complaint verified by a party with personal knowledge of the facts (see CPLR 3215 (f):
Goodman v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. 2 AD3d 581 [2d Dept 2003]; Drake v Drake, 296 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2002]; Parratta v McAllister, 283 AD2d 625 [2d Dept 2001]). Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion should have been denied, with leave to renew
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on proper papers (see Henriquez v Purins, 245 AD2d 337, 338 [2d Dept 1997]).
(See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Betts, 67 AD3d 735 [2d Dept 2009]; Hosten v Oladapo, 44 AD3d 1006 [2d Dept 2007]; Matone v Sycamore Realty Corp., 31 AD3d 721 [2d Dept 2006]; Taebong Choi v JKS Dry Cleaning Equip. Corp., 15 AD3d 566 [2d Dept 2005]; Peniston v Epstein, 10 AD3d 450 [2d Dept 2004]; De Vivo v Spargo, 287 AD2d 535 [2d Dept 2001]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the November 11, 2010 affirmation presented by Donna D. Maio, Esq., of Mathews & Matthews, counsel for plaintiff, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, in this action to foreclose a mortgage for the premises located at 2035 East 63rd Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8406, Lot 64, County of Kings) is deemed defective; and it is further
ORDERED, that counsel for plaintiff, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, has forty-five (45) days from this decision and order to correct the deficiencies in its motion for an order of reference for the premises located at 2035 East 63rd Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8406, Lot 64, County of Kings), or the instant foreclosure action will be dismissed with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that counsel for plaintiff, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, must submit to the Court, with the corrected deficiencies in its motion for an order of reference for the premises located at 2035 East 63rd Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8406, Lot 64, County of Kings), a new affirmation, pursuant to the October 20, 2010 Administrative Order, announced by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman and ordered by Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau, using the new revised standard Court form, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2106 and under the penalties of perjury, that counsel for plaintiff, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK: has "based upon my communications [with named representative or representatives of plaintiff], as well as upon my own inspection and reasonable inquiry under the circumstances,...that, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the Summons, Complaint and other papers filed or submitted to the Court in this matter contain no false statements of fact or law"; and, is "aware of my obligations under New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 1200) and 22 NYCRR Part 130."
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This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
ENTER
________________________________
HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK
J. S. C.
VA Bankruptcy Judge slams Deutsche Bank for robo-signing
On November 8, 2010, a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge in the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, slammed Deutsche Bank National Trust Company appearing as a securitization trustee and alleged creditor for using a Deed of Appointment (a document initiating foreclosure in Virginia) that was fraudulently signed by Mr. Liquenda Allotey, now a known robo-signer and employee of Lender Processing Services (LPS), a company under investigation by at least one State Attorney General.
The judge stated:
"It is certainly true that in Virginia recitals in a recorded instrument are prima facie evidence of the truth of those matters but prima facie does not mean conclusive and a party can always present evidence to show that the recitals are incorrect. I believe that the plaintiff here has produced enough evidence to call into serious questions whether Allotey [the robo-signer] was in fact a vice president and a person authorized to sign the deed of appointment of substitute trustees; and since I have counsel for the firm here, I would strongly suggest that . . . it obtain a new deed of appointment of substitute trustees, signed by someone who actually was an officer of Deutsche Bank."
Even though the fraud claim could not ultimately proceed for other (procedural) reasons, the above pronouncement is significant because it addresses on the record the issue of the burden of proof in foreclosure defense cases in non-judicial states, such as Virginia. An excerpt from the hearing transcript can be accessed here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44479970/Transcript-Excerpt-Long-AP
The judge stated:
"It is certainly true that in Virginia recitals in a recorded instrument are prima facie evidence of the truth of those matters but prima facie does not mean conclusive and a party can always present evidence to show that the recitals are incorrect. I believe that the plaintiff here has produced enough evidence to call into serious questions whether Allotey [the robo-signer] was in fact a vice president and a person authorized to sign the deed of appointment of substitute trustees; and since I have counsel for the firm here, I would strongly suggest that . . . it obtain a new deed of appointment of substitute trustees, signed by someone who actually was an officer of Deutsche Bank."
Even though the fraud claim could not ultimately proceed for other (procedural) reasons, the above pronouncement is significant because it addresses on the record the issue of the burden of proof in foreclosure defense cases in non-judicial states, such as Virginia. An excerpt from the hearing transcript can be accessed here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44479970/Transcript-Excerpt-Long-AP
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